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Symposium: Rational Actors or
Rational Fools? The Implications of
Psychology for Products Liability
Introduction
Carl T. Bogus*
Why is a law review symposium filled with psychologists and
marketing experts (as well as distinguished products liability and
tort scholars)? And what is the title of the symposium supposed to
mean? In this introduction, I shall try to briefly answer those
questions and try to explain what is at stake.
The story that leads us to the present moment begins during
World War II with the Austrian school of economics and its most
prominent member, Friedrich von Hayek. This was a time when
totalitarian governments-in Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia and
Japan-appeared frighteningly successful. Many wondered
whether this was the inevitable face of the future. Would totalitar-
ian systems ultimately prevail over democratic, free-market sys-
tems, if not immediately on the battlefield then later through
scientifically planned economics?
Hayek and the Austrian school of economics pursued an enter-
prise of trying to show why centrally planned economies-what he
called collectivist systems-were inferior to free market economies.
Hayek conceded that in an ideal world there would be great advan-
tages to a planned economy, but he argued that, as a practical mat-
ter, it was impossible for central planners to do all the supply and
demand calculations necessary to direct a large, modern economy.1
Should the state produce more shoes or more tires, more socks or
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more coats, more nails or more lunch boxes, more canned peaches
or more canned tomatoes, and so on? There are simply too much
data to analyze and too many calculations to make.
What made Hayek so successful was his ability to tie this prac-
tical, seemingly objective argument to normative arguments about
freedom and liberty. "[1It would be impossible for any mind to com-
prehend the infinite variety of different needs of different people
which compete for the available resources and to attach a definite
weight to each,"2 he wrote. "This," he argued, "is the fundamental
fact on which the whole philosophy of individualism is based."3
Hayek continued:
[Tihe limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible
to include in our scale of values more than a sector of the
needs of the whole society, and that, since, strictly speaking,
scales of value can exist only in individual minds, nothing but
partial scales of values exist-scales which are inevitably dif-
ferent and often inconsistent with each other. From this the
individualist concludes that the individuals should be al-
lowed, within defined limits, to follow their own values and
preferences rather than somebody else's; that within these
spheres the individual's system of ends should be supreme
and not subject to any dictation by others.4
In the United States, Hayek caught the attention of Aaron Di-
rector, an economist associated with the University of Chicago.5 In
1944, at Director's urging, the University of Chicago Press pub-
lished Hayek's now-classic work, The Road to Serfdom, which had
previously been rejected by three other publishers. 6 A couple of
years later, Hayek helped the University of Chicago obtain sub-
stantial funding for a center dedicated to promoting private enter-
prise. 7 It is historically significant that the donor stipulated that
the center be affiliated-not with the economics department, as one
might have expected-but with the law school.8 Hayek joined the
2. Id. at 65-66.
3. Id. at 66.
4. Id.
5. See generally Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 339-48
(1995) (discussing Aaron Director's involvement with Hayek's career).




Chicago faculty, Director headed the center, 9 and the field that we
today think of as law-and-economics was born.
Hayek never argued that people were rational actors. On the
contrary, he conceded that the masses could be manipulated by
propaganda, advertising and other forces.' 0 "But this does not
mean," he wrote, "that anyone is competent, or ought to have
power, to select those to whom this freedom is to be reserved. It
certainly does not justify the presumption of any group of people to
claim the right to determine what people ought to think or be-
lieve."" Hayek did not argue that individuals were competent to
make choices for themselves; rather, he based his argument on the
inability, and the immorality, of central planners making choices
for them.
Ironically, Hayek's argument was consistent with the concept
of bounded rationality, that is, that decision-making is constrained
because people can only possess and process limited amounts of
information. Herbert Simon illustrated the idea of bounded ration-
ality by comparing economic actors to chess players. 12 In choosing
what move to make, a chess player must consider what response
his opponent will make, what options he will then have, what pos-
sible moves his opponent can make to each of those options, and so
on, until the end of the game. If chess players could consider all of
these possibilities they would play perfectly. But the possible sce-
narios approach the infinite, and neither the human mind nor any
computer yet devised can analyze this vast amount of information.
However, it is now the central premise of the Chicago neo-
classical economics (on which law-and-economics is based) that
both business firms and individuals are rational actors. That is,
not only do businesses act rationally to maximize profits, but con-
sumers act rationally to maximize their own interests. Milton
Friedman, who became the most influential member of the Chicago
school, argues that the free market works so well because people
are rational, or at least, people act as if they are rational. 13 In
contrast to Simon's chess player, Friedman offers a billiard player
9. See id.
10. See Hayek, supra note 1, at 180.
11. Id.
12. See Duxbury, supra note 5, at 370.
13. See id. at 371.
20001
4 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
analogy.14 Friedman argues that while an expert billiard player
may not consciously know all the laws of physics, geometry, and
mathematics that explain how the force she applies to the cue ball
causes the other balls to react and travel in desired directions, she
nevertheless plays as if she does. 15 In much the same way, argues
Friedman, business firms seeking to maximize profits behave as if
they possess and have processed all the information necessary for
them to succeed. 16
Rational choice theory, as it is called, has extended its influ-
ence well beyond the confines of economics. It has become an im-
portant school of thought-aspiring to become the dominant school
of thought-in both political science 17 and in law,' 8 where it is
known as law-and-economics. Richard A. Posner, the best known
proponent of law-and-economics, argues that individuals act in
their own self-interest so regularly and so predictably that when
an individual claims he is wrestling with a difficult decision and
has not yet decided what course to pursue, others who know this
individual well and understand his needs and desires can better
predict what he will do than can the individual himself.1 9
Although all of law-and-economics rests on the single pillar of
rational choice theory, the argument that people are rational ac-
tors is often presented as nothing more than an assumption. The
prime example is Richard A. Posner's Economic Analysis of Law,20
which is undoubtedly the single most important text in the field of
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political science departments and journals); James Ryerson, Games People Play:
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18. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 166 (1993) (stating that
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19. See Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 187 (1990).
20. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed. 1992).
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of his 722-page work to this fundamental proposition. On the first
page of the first chapter, Posner writes:
As conceived in this book, economics is the science of rational
choice in a world-our world-in which resources are limited in
relation to human wants. The task of economics, so defined,
is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a ra-
tional maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we
shall call his "self-interest."2 1
How, one wonders, can so grand an edifice rest on a mere
assumption?
The title of our symposium comes from an article by Amartya
K. Sen, entitled Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foun-
dations of Economic Theory.22 In this article, Sen argues that ra-
tional actor theory is flawed because people are more complex than
the theory allows. Rational actor theory requires reducing a per-
son's needs, desires, motives, impulses and moral judgments to
some kind of standard measure. Rational actor theorists see peo-
ple as self-seeking egoists because "[it is possible to define a per-
son's interests in such a way that no matter what he does he can be
seen to be furthering his own interests in every isolated act of
choice."23 That is, when an individual chooses x rather than y, ra-
tional actor theorists conclude the individual preferred x to y, and
then assign a greater numerical value to the utility of x than the
utility of y. Sen notes such a theory will appear to validate itself
every time, except when the individual makes inconsistent
choices. 24
21. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Posner has
stated this assumption in even stronger terms:
The basic assumption of economics that guides the version of eco-
nomic analysis of law that I shall be presenting is that people are rational
maximizers of their satisfactions-all people (with the exception of small
children and the profoundly retarded) in all of their activities (except
when under the influence of psychosis or similarly deranged through drug
or alcohol abuse) that involve choice.
Posner, supra note 19, at 353.
22. Amartya K Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
of Economic Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 317 (1977).
23. Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
24. See id. at 322-23. And, although Sen does not mention it, the rational
actor theorist can conclude that values have changed over time, i.e., the individual
derived more utils of pleasure from vanilla yesterday but more utils of pleasure
from chocolate today. We would simply say the individual wanted vanilla yester-
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Rational choice theory, Sen argues, is too simple, too reduc-
tionist, because it assumes that all of a person's interests, welfare,
ideas, and desires can be given one preference ordering.25 It can
all be measured with the same yardstick. He continues:
Can one preference ordering do all these things? A person
thus described may be "rational" in the limited sense of re-
vealing no inconsistencies in his choice behavior, but if he has
no use for these distinctions between quite different concepts,
he must be a bit of a fool. The purely economic man is indeed
close to being a social moron. 26
Despite the criticisms, rational choice theorists continue to ar-
gue that people act rationally in all sorts of things-love, marriage,
adoptions, pornography, taking drugs, playing the lottery-indeed,
perhaps all pursuits.27 Some ridicule these views.28 Both sides in
the debate are now increasingly turning to cognitive psychology.
Psychologists talk about bounded rationality, that is, limits to ra-
tional thought and behavior. They talk about cognitive biases,
which can be thought of as quirks or disruptions in rationality. 29
They claim, as I understand them, that some cognitive biases are
predictable. The idea that people act irrationally in predictable
ways presents conflicting challenges and opportunities to both
sides in the debate. Proponents of rational choice theory see it as a
means of closing loopholes in their grand theory. They believe that
if we can understand when people will depart from their usual be-
havior of acting rationally, and know how they will act even when
day and chocolate today, but the legal economist believes he has achieved a deeper
understanding of behavior.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 335-36.
27. See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976)
(applying rational choice theory to a wide spectrum of activities including love,
altruism and drug taking); Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and
Why it Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 71 (applying rational choice theory to the lot-
tery); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978) (applying rational choice theory to
adoptions).
28. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, The Economics of Brushing Teeth, 82 J. Pol.
Econ. 887 (1974).
29. A superb overview of the psychological literature can be found in Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999).
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they are acting irrationally, we can refine the predictive power of
rational choice theory. Critics, on the other hand, argue that if
people act irrationally in predicable ways, they can be manipulated
by propaganda and advertising.
Some of this is about technique. In the products liability field,
we want to know whether we can help consumers make rational
purchasing decisions and use potentially dangerous products
safely by furnishing them with information. To know that, we
must understand how much information consumers can absorb
and how they process information. But much more than technique
is at stake. At bottom, this is a deep political argument. The de-
bate today is, of course, no longer between collectivism or capital-
ism; it is about how much regulation is desirable in a free market
economy. Those who believe that people are rational actors tend to
believe that less regulation is necessary. Consumers can best take
care of themselves. Those who believe that people may often be
irrational-and susceptible to manipulation by propagandists and
advertisers-favor more regulation.
We decided that it would be useful not only to have legal schol-
ars argue about the implications of cognitive psychology for prod-
ucts liability, but to hear directly from the psychologists
themselves. We are fortunate to have some of the nation's most
prominent cognitive psychologists and marketing experts partici-
pate. They have much to teach us.
20001

